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Cable-Copyright: The Corruption
of Consensus
By

LESLIE

A.

SWACKHAMER*

I
Introduction
[T] his is the corruption of consensus-the attempt to find uni-

versal agreement on so many issues that great public purposes
are eroded by tiny problems solved by adjustment and
adaptation.'
The 1976 Copyright Revision Act was over twenty years in
the making.2 During most of those twenty years, the cablecopyright issue stalemated the revision of the 1909 Copyright
Act, legislation which was passed before the invention of radio
or television.' A lack of integration between communications
and copyright policy formed the core of the cable-copyright
conflict. To coordinate these policies and breach the copyright
impasse, the leaders of the broadcasting, cable and programming production industries negotiated a consensus which bifurcated the solutions of the conflict to the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) and the
Congress.4 Upon this "Consensus Agreement," Congress
based the cable portion of the 1976 Copyright Revision Act, and
the FCC built its cable policy for the 1970's.5 The operation of
the consensus to the benefit of all parties privy to it depended
upon the maintenance of the balance between the copyright
and communications portions of the agreement. Even as Congress approved the 1976 Copyright Revision Act, however, that
*

B.A., Emory University, 1980; J.D., George Washington University, 1983; Associ-

ate, Wilner and Scheiner, Washington, D.C.
1. Burnes, The Corruption of Consensus, in THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED 110
(Livingston & Thompson eds. 1972).
2. For a comprehensive discussion, see Brennan, Legislative History and Chapter
1 of S. 22, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 193 (1976); 1976 HOUSE REPORT, infra note 12, at 47-50.
3. The Copyright Act of 1909 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1976), amended
by 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)).
4. See infra text accompanying note 42.
5. See infra text accompanying note 48.
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balance was shifting. The FCC abandoned its commitment to
the Consensus Agreement and dismantled the regulations
once erected to accommodate it.6 Meanwhile, the cable industry burgeoned at unanticipated rates, rendering many of the
basic premises of the 1976 Copyright Revision Act obsolete.7
Today the 1976 Copyright Revision Act operates as a license
for cable to compete unfairly in the video marketplace. Once
again, Congress is moving to mitigate the cable-copyright conflict. Once again, the foundation of the congressional solution
is industry consensus.
The "congressional reaction" may be more properly styled
"industry action." As such, it is not nearly as directed toward
national communications policies and copyright principles as
it is toward the division of the mass communications market
among the major market participants. The 1976 Copyright Revision Act as it pertains to cable is a house built upon the shifting sands of FCC regulatory policy; the "revision" of the 1976
Revision is a house built upon the quicksand of financial interest, with communications policies and copyright principles
buried in its basement.
Before examining the cable-copyright controversy as it exists today, it is necessary to place the conflict in its historical
context. This discussion therefore begins with an overview of
the cable-copyright provisions in the 1976 Copyright Revision
Act and their legislative history. Having established the basis
and rationale for those provisions, this discussion then evaluates their validity in light of developments since 1976. The first
prong of this evaluation focuses upon the rather dramatic
changes which have transpired within the cable industry in
particular, and the video marketplace in general. This examination finds that the rationale for the compulsory license, as
opposed to full copyright liability for cable, may no longer be
valid.8
The second prong of the evaluation involves FCC deregulation of the cable industry. The FCC has abdicated responsibility for copyright portions of the Consensus Agreement,
rendering the copyright portion of the Agreement a license for
unfair competition in the video marketplace. The inquiry
could end at this point; given the changes in the regulatory en6. See infra text accompanying notes 116-19.
7. See infra text accompanying note 109.
8. See infra note 60.
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vironment and the growth and vitality of the cable industry,
the compulsory license now operates as a derogation of the basic principles and purposes of copyright.' Since its inception,
however, the regulation of cable has been characterized by
flux, and possibilities exist for the reinstitution of syndicated
exclusivity and distant signal controls. 10
It is therefore necessary to examine the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal (CRT), the entity which may emerge from the restructuring process as the major counterweight in balancing
conflicting interests among key mass communications giants of
our age." Based on an evaluation of past performance, the
functioning of the CRT has been flawed at best. Any restructuring of communications and copyright law must institute
comprehensive structural changes within the CRT to be
effective.
Finally, as Congress will be the final arbiter of the cablecopyright controversy, recent proposed legislation is analyzed
to evaluate the congressional solution. What emerges is a return to legislation by consensus, an approach with something
for everyone and nothing for communications or copyright
policy.

II
Summary and Background of the Cable Copyright
Provisions in the 1976 Copyright Revision
Act
By the 1960's cable had established its viability in the marketplace, throwing communications law and regulation and the
copyright marketplace into a quandary over how best to fit
9. The ability to copyright is based upon the U.S. Constitution, which empowers
Congress to "Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Copyright does not guarantee financial success, but it gives one the right to achieve it, principally on the basis of public acceptance or rejection. "[TIhe copyright statute embodies the underlying principles of the
Constitution-freedom, risk and the reward for merit as determined by the public's
choice ....
The copyright system, when permitted to function as intended by the
Constitution, should facilitate fair competition in the distribution of program services."
Copyright/CableHearings, infra note 62, at 906-09 (statement of David Ladd, Register
of Copyrights).
10. See infra note 166.
11. Greene, The Cable Television Provzsions of the Revised CopyrightAct, 27 CATH.
U.L. REV. 263, 156 (1978).
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cable into their established general schemes. The question of
cable's copyright liability became a focal legislative issue in
the mid-1960's. 12 However, before copyright liability for cable
could be established through new legislation, it was necessary
to determine cable's liability under the 1909 Copyright Act.
The United States Supreme Court first examined the issue
in 1968, holding in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc. 3 that cable retransmission of local broadcasts was
not a "performance" under the 1909 Copyright Act, and hence
not an infringement of copyright. Using a functional analysis,
the Supreme Court reasoned that in the local setting, a cable
system operated as a "well-located antenna with an efficient
connection to the viewer's television set."' 4 Functioning as
such, cable merely constituted a passive conduit for rebroadcast, analogous to a "viewer" as opposed to a "performer."
Justice Fortas, dissenting, expressed disapproval with the
application of a simplistic functional analysis based upon
anachronistic principles to cable television, opining that the
time had come for Congress to legislate a solution.
This case calls not for the judgment of Solomon but for the dexterity of Houdini. We are here asked to consider whether and
how a technical, complex, and specific Act of Congress, the
Copyright Act, which was enacted in 1909, applies to one of the
recent products of scientific and promotional genius, CATV.
...Applying the normal jurisprudential tools-the words of
the Act, legislative history, and precedent-to the facts of the
case is like trying to repair a television set with a mallet.' 5
The Fortnightly Court noted that the Solicitor General
wished for a more definitive solution to the cable-copyright is12. In 1967, the House Judiciary Committee sought to resolve the cable-copyright
conflict in H.R. 2512 (90th Cong.), an early version of the revision bill. The bill died on
the Senate floor largely due to the cable-copyright impasse, See generally H.R. REP.
No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Further attempts at revision in the 91st Congress,
S. 542, and the 92nd Congress, S.644, failed for the same reason. See HOUSE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. No. 94, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 89 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 HOUSE REPORT].
13. 392 U.S. 390 (1968). See generally Lipper, The Congress,the Court and the Commissioners: A Legacy of Fortnightly, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 521 (1969).
14. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 399. The concept of "performance," an exclusive right
of copyright ownership, was built upon a theatre concept of performance to which
technology developed subsequent to the Act had to analogize. Applied to broadcasting, the broadcasters were treated by the courts as the performers, and viewers were
treated as analogous to the theatre audience. As a passive beneficiary of the performance, the viewer would not be a copyright infringer.
15. Id. at 402-03 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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sue and would have had the Court find that although cable systems were, in fact, performers, they were entitled to an
"implied in law license."' 6 The Court reiterated that under the
1909 law, a cable system was not a "performer," stating that the
accommodation of the "various competing considerations of
copyright, communications and antitrust policy" would be a
17
more appropriate job for Congress.
In 1974, in Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc.,18 the Supreme
Court expanded the Fortnightly rule to include the retransmission of distant signals. Using the functional analysis of Fortnightly, the Court found that the importation of distant signals
only operated as a quantitative difference in retransmission
rather than a qualitative difference. "The reception and
rechanneling of these signals for simultaneous viewing is essentially a viewer function, irrespective of the distance between the broadcasting station and the ultimate viewer."'19
Justice Stewart, writing for the 6-3 majority of Teleprompter,
once again emphasized the Court's view that the cable-copyright issue must be resolved by Congress.
These shifts in current business and commercial relationships,
while of significance with respect to the organization and
growth of the communications industry, simply cannot be controlled by means of litigation based on copyright legislation enacted more than a half century ago, when neither broadcast
television nor CATV was yet conceived. Detailed regulations
of these relationships, and any ultimate resolution of the many
sensitive and
important problems in this field, must be left to
20
Congress.
While effectively shifting the cable-copyright controversy
from the courts to the FCC and the Congress, the Supreme
Court meanwhile upheld the FCC's jurisdiction to promulgate
rules "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the
Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of tel21
evision broadcasting."
Throughout the 1960's, the Commission viewed cable as a
threat to the viability of local broadcasting in that cable's offer16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
(1972);

Id. at 401 n.32.
Id. at 401.
415 U.S. 394 (1974).
Id. at 408.
Id. at 414.
United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, rehg denied, 409 U.S. 898
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
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ing of greater program choice would fragment local viewing
audiences, reduce local advertising revenues, and thereby undermine the financial stability of the local broadcast station.2
Because the Commission's interpretation of the Communications Act mandated a bias in favor of local broadcasting, due to
no little pressure from broadcasters themselves,23 the Commission began building a regulatory structure to ensure cable's
supplementing rather than supplanting broadcasting. 24 The result was a virtual freeze on cable's development.25
The distant signal carriage rules, first promulgated in 1966,
were an essential component of cable's regulatory restraints.26
Originally, these rules required any new cable system to obtain a waiver from the Commission in order to carry a distant
signal. The cable company bore the burden of proving that local broadcasting would bear no adverse effects and that the
public interest would be served by the carriage of the distant
signal. The process for establishing this proof involved elaborate evidentiary hearings which have been described as cumbersome at best.27 The reality of this mode of distant signal

regulation was that the Commission
rarely issued waivers al28
lowing distant signal carriage.

The Commission's next solution to the distant signal carriage problem was retransmission consent. 29 Theoretically,
this system permits unlimited distant signal carriage, subject
to the prior consent of the distant originating system. In practice, however,
retransmission consent usually means no
30
consent.

Other rules contributing to the effective freeze on cable
22. See First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, para. 8 (1965).
23. R. BERNER, CONSTRAINTS ON THE REGULATORY PROCESS 15, 18 (1976).

24. See Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966).
25. See generally D. LE Duc, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC: A CRISIS IN MEDIA
CONTROL 182-83 (1973); Chazen, The Price of Free TV., ATL. MONTHLY, Mar. 1969, at 59.
26. Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725.
27. Chazen & Ross, Federal Regulation of Cable Television: The Visible Hand, 83
HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1825 (1970).
28. The major beneficiaries of the waiver consent provisions seem to have been
the VHF giants. In markets below the top 100, importation of distant signals was permitted absent broadcaster contest, and waivers were more easily obtained in markets
below the top 25. See R. SMrrH, THE WIRED NATION 51-53 (1973).
29. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, paras.
38-40 (1968). See also Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 24 F.C.C.2d 580,
paras. 3-4 (1970).
30. Based on existing contracts with copyright owners, the broadcasters normally
would have insufficient authority to grant retransmission consent. The practical effect
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growth included mandatory carriage rules nonduplication
31
rules and syndicated exclusivity rules.
As broadcasting continued to flourish despite the "cable
threat," and as public criticism of the regulatory stranglehold
on cable increased, the Commission began reevaluating its position on cable. Recognizing cable more as an independent
technology than a broadcasting supplement, on August 5, 1971,
the Commission issued a Letter of Intent to allow distant signal
importation into urban markets. 2
The August 5 Letter proposed to allow cable operators to import distant signals into the top one hundred television markets under the rationale that this was the minimum number
necessary to "open the way for cable development" without
harming local broadcasting. 3 Of the two distant signals, one
would be required to be from within two hundred miles of
cable operation, with VHF stations given preference. 34 In order to gain the full support of his plan from the Commission,
Chairman Dean Burch added sweeteners to the proposal, including public access requirements, aids to UHF and generosity to educational television. The proposal would also require
all new cable systems within the top two hundred television
markets to have a minimum channel capacity of twenty and to
be capable of two-way service. 35 Burch's tactics worked; the
Commission supported his proposal six to one.
However, Burch was unable to garner sufficient industry and
administration support for his proposed rules. Even before the
publication of the Letter, the broadcasters and copyright owners were objecting to its contents. The Letter made no mention
of copyright liability, while it greatly expanded cable's potential for penetration of television markets. Stinging from the
Supreme Court's denial of copyright liability in Fortnightly,
and fearing the outcome of Teleprompter, the broadcasters and
of retransmission consent was the absence of any new signals in the top 100 markets.
See R. BERNER, supra note 23, at 25.
31. See First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. at paras. 83-126.
32. Commission Proposals for Regulation of Cable Television, 31 F.C.C.2d 115
(1971). A significant factor in this policy shift was the appointment of Dean Burch as
new chairman of the FCC. See R. BERNER, supra note 23, at 29.
33. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 264 app. C (1972).
34. These are known as the "leapfrogging rules," designed under the auspices of
FCC commitment to UHF and local broadcasting.
35. Public access was offered for Johnson, UHF for R.E. Lee, and ETV for H.R. Lee.
See R. BERNER, supra note 23, at 30; Shape of 'Final'CATV Plan, TELEVISION DIGEST,
Aug. 9, 1971, at 3.
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copyright owners saw the FCC's more oppressive regulations
as their only protection against cable's encroachment. The
broadcasters and copyright owners dug in their heels and
mounted a massive lobbying effort to maintain the status quo,
forcing the process toward solution of their problems, such as
communications
and copyright policy reconsiderations, to a
36
standstill.
Senator Pastore, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on
Communications, wishing to deflect the controversy from his
committee but also to effect a solution, drafted Clay J. Whitehead, Director of the Office of Telecommunications Policy
(OTP), to resolve the impasse.3 7 Whitehead, also Chairman of
the Cabinet Committee on Cable Television, convened representatives from the National Association of Broadcasters
(NAB), the National Cable Television Association (NCTA),
and the copyright owners in an effort to work out an agreement
whereby the FCC could implement a viable cable policy and
the Congress could implement a viable copyright revision.3 8
Whitehead's efforts resulted in the "OTP Consensus Agreement" which formed the cornerstone for subsequent FCC regulation and copyright legislation pertaining to cable.3 9
Without the formation of this Consensus Agreement, it is
doubtful that the revision of the 1909 Copyright Act, in the
works since 1955, would have been in place by 1976. Each time
36. The Parties refused to budge. Broadcasters and copyright holders
threatened to block any cable rules that permitted the importation of distant
signals until copyright legislation was adopted-by exerting their impressive
political influence in Congress, forcing Congressional hearings. Cable owners
refused to support copyright legislation until the cable rules were adopted.
The Senate Copyright Subcommittee refused to pass a copyright revision until
the question of cable was settled, and it refused to enact a separate copyright
law for cable. The process ground to a halt.
Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at 314 (opinion of Commissioner Johnson). For a summary of industry sentiment based upon review of the trade press, especially Variety, Television Digest and Broadcasting,see R. BERNER, supra note 23, at
41.
37. "Pastore was concerned that the industry groups reach some kind of accommodation. He did not want ... to deal with the cable issue at that time on those terms."
Interview with Clay Whitehead (June 5,1973), reprintedin R. BERNER, supranote 23, at
58 n.28. "It [Congress] has basically dumped the hot potato [the copyright issue] in
the Commission's lap." R. BERNER, supra note 23, at 57 n.22. (Harry Shooshan, administrative aide to Representative Torbert Macdonald, describing the congressional handling of the cable-copyright issue).
38. For a detailed account of the process toward consensus, see R. BERNER, supra
note 23, at 41-50.
39. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at 284 app. D.
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a new revision bill seemed ready for passage, the cable-copyright impasse would prove insurmountable. 0 Dissent focused
upon two central issues: the form FCC regulations would take
to protect copyright owners by limiting the signals and programming that cable could carry, and the extent of copyright
liability for cable, based upon a compulsory license.4 1 Agreement existed as to the need for a compulsory license and for
communications regulations limiting cable's access to certain
signals and programming, but the form that these provisions
would take found no concurrence. The Consensus Agreement,
therefore, was seized upon as the solution to the impasse, and
Congress and the Commission embraced the industry proposal
as if it were their own.
The major points of the Consensus Agreements were:
1) syndicated program exclusivity rules
2) distant signal rules
3) a broadcaster's right to sue for copyright infringement if a
cable system violated an exclusivity agreement, and
4) cable copyright liability through a compulsory license
system.
The first two provisions of the Consensus Agreement were incorporated into the FCC's 1972 Report and Order 2 and the
third and fourth provisions Congress incorporated into the 1976
Copyright Revision.4 3
One may question cable's acquiescense to any copyright liability when the Supreme Court had held that cable retransmissions were not subject to copyright liability and when the FCC
had indicated its support of a more lenient policy in its August
5 Letter. However, the cable-copyright and regulatory issues
had kept cable's future status uncertain. Cable's best interest
was to effect a viable compromise in order to gain the certainty
40. See Hearingson Copyright Law Revision Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,94th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pts. 1-3 (1975).
41. See Copyright Issues: Cable Television and Performance Rights: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Libertiesand the Administration of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1979) (statement of Barbara
Ringer, Register of Copyrights) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Hearings].
42. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
43. General Revision of the Copyright Law, Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976)). A stated reason for the bifurcation of the Consensus
Agreement was that the dynamics and complexities of the exclusivity rules required
administrative control. Cable Television, 36 F.C.C.2d at para. 63 n.34. See also Letter
from OTP Director Clay Whitehead to Senator Pastore (Nov. 15, 1971), reprinted in R.
BERNER, supra note 23, at 96 app. B.

COMM/ENT L. J.

[Vol. 6

necessary to attract money from financial institutions for capital investment and development.' Broadcasting's reaction to
the FCC's Letter of August 5 threatened to bring the cablecopyright issue to the Senate floor for resolution, where cable's
interests were least likely to be served.4 5 Since the elements of
the Consensus Agreement were still preferable to a regulatory
freeze, and to a congressional mandate of full copyright liability, cable acquiesced.4 6
For broadcasting and copyright owner interests, the exclusivity provision was the linchpin of the Consensus Agreement.
The FCC exclusivity provision in place prior to the Consensus
Agreement effectively protected only network affiliates. The
Consensus Agreement's form of exclusivity protection, however, called for a virtual ban on cable retransmission of any
syndicated programming in the top fifty television markets for
the period of one year.4 7
In 1972, the FCC passed the Consensus Agreement exactly
as presented in the original form.4 8 The exclusivity rules consisted of a graduated scheme of restrictions based on the size
of the local market. The rules accorded the most exclusive protection to the top fifty television markets "from which the bulk
of program supplier revenue is derived and where these restrictions are consequently most needed to insure the contin'49
ued health of the television programming industry.
The exclusivity protection in the next fifty-one to one hundred television markets was more complicated but less comprehensive. To invoke exclusivity protection, a station in this
44. "An industry with cable's [growth] potential simply can't be built on so critical
an area of uncertainty." Letter from Dean Burch, Chairman of the FCC, to Sen. McClellan, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, reprinted in Cable Television, 36 F.C.C.2d at 286 app. E.
45. See Cable Television, 36 F.C.C.2d at 314.
46. Barbara Ringer, former Register of Copyrights, indicated that cable also desired from the Consensus to gain stature, stability and respectability as part of the
communications industry. She also pointed out that copyright owners were not totally
unwilling to bargain since, in light of Fortnightly, they had nothing to lose as far as
copyright was concerned and they saw that the growth of cable would eventually generate revenues for copyright owners from cable originating services. 1979 Hearings,
supra note 41, at 28-29.
47. The FCC defines syndicated programming as non-network programming sold
in more than one market. See Cable Television, 36 F.C.C.2d at para. 100 n.53.
48. Whitehead gained Burch's support in November. See id. at 317.
49. Id. at 170. One concern was the continued supply of television programming.
See Network Television Broadcasting, 23 F.C.C.2d 382 (1970), affd, Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971).
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market must have an exclusive contract for the program and
broadcast the program during prime time. If the station has
met this test, the protection accorded depends upon the nature
of the programming, for example, whether it is first-run or rerun, and may last from one to two years.
The distant signal rules, like the syndicated exclusivity
rules, were tailored to the size of the market. Remembering
that the must-carry provisions required the carriage of all local
signals upon request,5 0 the distant signals allowed the carriage
of the following complement of signals on a may-carry basis:
1) In television markets 1-50: Three full network stations.
Three independent stations.
2) In television markets 51-100: Three full network stations.
Two independent stations.
3) In smaller television markets (below 100):
Three full net51
work stations. One independent station.
4) In communities entirely outside the zone of any commercial television station: no limit on distant signals.
In keeping with the Consensus Agreement's single plan with
a bifurcation of responsibilities, the second half of the Agreement rested upon copyright legislation. The Consensus Agreement mandated that a compulsory license be granted for all
local signals as defined by the FCC and for signals authorized
under the FCC's "initial package"-that is, the 1972 Rules--or
grandfathered when the initial package went into effect.5 2 The
Agreement specified that although the FCC would retain
power to authorize additional distant signals, the compulsory
license would not be granted with respect to those signals.5 3
Before detailing the provisions of the 1976 Copyright Revision Act implementing the second half of the Consensus
Agreement, it must be emphasized that the Consensus was a
comprehensive scheme, represented by two separate yet interdependent documents, the 1972 FCC Rules and the 1976 Copyright Revision Act. That the framers of both documents were
aware of this is clear. In letters exchanged between Dean
50. Cable Television, 36 F.C.C.2d at para. 79.

51. Id. at 177. If this standard is met by the carriage of all signals required to be
carried, i.e., "must-carries," two additional independents will be authorized for carriage. Id.
52. In this case, grandfathering would be exempt from future obligations with respect to exclusivity agreements but would not be exempt from future liability for copyright payments.
53. Cable Television, 36 F.C.C.2d at para. 66.
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Burch, Chairman of the FCC, and John McClellan, Chairman
of the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and
Copyrights, the importance of the FCC and the Congress acting in concert was stressed, since "the nature of consensus is
that it must hold together in its entirety or not at all."5 4 The
FCC, in its 1972 Report and Order implementing its portion of
the Consensus, reaffirms the interdependence of FCC rules
and copyright legislation.
Finally, the enactment of cable copyright legislation by Congress-with the Commission's program before it-would in effect reaffirm the Commission's jurisdiction to carry out that
It is important to emphasize that for full effecprogram ....
tiveness the consensus agreement requires Congressional approval, not just that of the Commission. The rule will, of
course, be put into effect promptly. Without Congressional valwe would have to re-examine some aspects of
idation, however,
55
the program.
The House Reports on the Revision also reflect awareness of
the delicate balance between communications and copyright
policies for cable. The House Committee on the Judiciary's
Report on the General Revision states that "any statutory
scheme that imposes copyright liability on cable television systems must take account of the intricate and complicated rules
and regulations adopted by the Federal Communications Commission to govern the cable television industry.' ' 56 In this
spirit, Congress defined distant signals for copyright purposes
in the same terms as the FCC's mandatory-signal-carriage
rules, and barred infringement actions against signals required
57
to be carried by the FCC.
In no uncertain terms, the 1976 House Report went on to
warn any organization which determines communication policy, in particular the FCC, against relying on the Copyright Revision as a basis for changing the delicate balance of
regulation. The Report specifically counseled against using the
Revision as a license for increased use of distant signals. 8
The copyright portions of the Consensus Agreement are embodied in sections 111, 501, 510 and chapter 8 of the 1976 Copy54.
55.
56.
57.

Cable Television, 36 F.C.C.2d at 286 app. E.
Id. at 167.
1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 12, at 89.
17 U.S.C. §§ 111(b)(2), 111(f) (Supp. III 1979). These signals may not be al-

tered. 17 U.S.C. §111(b)(3) (1982).
58. 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 89.
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right Revision Act.59 The Revision specifies that a cable
retransmission is a public performance," and therefore subject
to full copyright liability.
When recognizing that cable retransmissions should be subject to copyright liability, Congress found that "it would be impractical and unduly burdensome to require every cable
system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose work
was retransmitted by a cable system."'" Upon this recognition
of the difficulty of copyright negotiation in the cable marketplace, Congress premised the compulsory license provision for
cable.62
The requirements for a cable system's eligibility to claim the
benefit of a compulsory license are set forth in section 111:
59. See generally Botein, The New Copyright Act and Cable Television-A Signal
of Change, 24 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 1 (1976); Brennan, An Overview of Copyright
and the Copyright Bill, 17 IDEA 5 (Fall, 1975 Conference Proceedings); Meyer, The Feat
of Houdini, or How the New Act Disentanglesthe CA TV-Copyright Knot, 22 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 545 (1977). For a comprehensive discussion of the revision, see Brennan, Legislative History and Chapter 1 of S. 22, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 193 (1976).
60. The right of performance is one of five exclusive rights granted copyright owners by 17 U.S.C. § 106. The other rights incident to copyright ownership are reproduction, adaptation, publication and display. The 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 63,
analogizes cable performance thus: "[A] singer is performing when he or she sings a
song; a broadcasting network is performing when it transmits his or her performance
....
[A] local broadcaster is performing when it transmits the network broadcast; a
cable television system is performing when it retransmits the broadcast to its subscribers . . . ." To constitute an infringement of copyright, the performance must be
done "publicly."
[A] performance made available by transmission to the public at large is 'public' even though the recipients are not gathered in a single place, and even if
there is no proof that any of the potential recipients was operating his receiving apparatus at the time of the transmission. The same principles apply
whenever the potential recipients of the transmission represent a limited segment of the public, such as the occupants of hotel rooms or the subscribersof a
cable television service.
Id. at 64-65 (emphasis added).
61. 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 12, at 89.
62. The difficulty of negotiations theory consisted of two parts: (1) "excessive leverage" theories, i.e., the domination by big television networks, big television stations
and big television program producers of the programming networks which would close
cable out were it forced to bargain in the programming marketplace on equal terms
and (2) "market necessity" theories, i.e., given the numerous cable systems, channels,
distant signals and programs, an individual cable system's bargaining on a signal-bysignal basis would be prohibitive in terms of time and cost. See Copyright/CableTelevision: Hearings on H.R. 1805, H.R. 2007, H.R. 2108, H.R.3528, H.R. 3530, H.R. 3560, H.R.
3940, H.R. 5870, and H.R. 5949 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st & 2nd
Sess. 703 (1981-82) (testimony of Hon. Bernard Wunder, Asst. Sec'y of Commerce for
the Nat'l Telecommunications and Information Agency) [hereinafter cited as Copyright/CableHearings].
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1. With some exceptions for cable systems located outside of
the continental United States, retransmissions under the license must be simultaneous;
2. Cable systems are prohibited from intentionally altering
the content of a retransmitted program, except in specific limited situations pertaining to television commercial advertising
research. Nor may they delete or alter commercial advertising
or station announcements;
3. Cable systems may retransmit only those signals which
they are authorized to carry under the signal carriage and program exclusivity rules of the Federal Communications
Commission;
4. Cable systems are prohibited from importing foreign television and radio signals pursuant to the compulsory licenses,
with the exception of Canadian and Mexican signals receivable
within limited zones along our borders, and "grandfathered"
U.S. cable systems;
5. Cable systems must file and keep current Notices of Identity and Signal Carriage Complement and Statements of Account with, and pay their statutory royalty fees to, the U.S.
Copyright Office.63
If a cable system fails to comply with the above conditions, its
compulsory license may be invalid and its retransmission activity subject to full copyright liability.
Further limitations are placed upon a cable system's entitlement to a compulsory license through restriction of the type of
signals that will qualify to "those over-the-air broadcast signals
that a cable system is authorized to carry pursuant to the rules
and regulations of the FCC.1 64 Once the compulsory license is
granted, the cable system may not alter, delete or add to any
advertising or station announcements.
The compulsory license does not apply to programming
originated by a cable system or from nonbroadcast satellitedistributed networks.6 5 Pursuant to its determination that the
retransmission of signals within a cable system's local service
area does not economically injure copyright owners because
they are fully compensated under their broadcast licenses for
the use of their programs in the local markets, Congress exempted the retransmission of local signals from any copyright
liability. Congress also exempted the retransmission of net63. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c) (1982).
64. H.R. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1976).
65. 17 U.S.C. § 111(a) (3) (Supp. III 1979).
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work programming from copyright liability, reasoning that
"It] he copyright owner contracts with the network on the basis
of his programming reaching all markets served by the network and is compensated accordingly."6 6 Accordingly, Congress limited copyright liability of cable systems under the
compulsory license to the retransmission of distant non-network programming.6 7
After satisfying the statutory form, content and filing requirements for obtaining a compulsory license, a cable system
is guaranteed use of copyrighted works without the permission
of the copyright owner at statutory, rather than marketplace,
rates. The establishment of the statutory royalty rates was the
last obstacle to the passage of the 1976 Copyright Revision Act.
The rates were not based upon any economic empirical data
but were hammered out in a last minute compromise between
"the two industries most directly affected by the establishment
of copyright royalties for cable television systems," the National Cable Television Association and the Motion Picture Association of America.6 8
The fee formula is based upon the gross receipts of a cable
system and the number of distant signal equivalents.6 9 Congress accorded small cable systems preferential treatment in
their royalty payment by computing fees on a reduced flat rate
calculated without regard to the number of distant signals carried, but solely upon a percentage of their gross receipts. The
rationale for this treatment is that "many smaller cable systems carry a large number of distant signals, especially those
located in areas where over-the-air television service is sparse,
and because smaller cable systems may be less able to shoul66. 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 12, at 90.
67. The Act also exempts from copyright liability secondary transmission of instructional programming by governmental or nonprofit educational institutions, passive carriers, boosters and translators operated on a nonprofit basis, and apartment
and hotel master antenna systems carrying local broadcast signals to the private
rooms of guests or residents, so long as this is a mere relay of the broadcast. Id. at 9394.
68. For background on this last gasp effort to save the Revision, see NCTA and
MPAA come to terms on copyright, BROADCASTING, Apr. 19, 1976, at 48.
69. Gross receipts for fee calculation purposes are only those receipts from basic
service retransmission. A distant signal equivalent is the numerical value assigned to
the retransmission of a distant signal. The value is dependent on the nature of the
originating station-independent stations are most highly valued, with noncommercial
educational stations receiving the lowest valuation. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(f) (1982). For
current litigation involving the interpretation of "gross receipts," see COM. DAILY, Sept.
26, 1983, at 3.
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der the burden of copyright payments than larger systems
",70

Semiannually, cable systems deposit their statutory royalties with the Copyright Office. After deducting administrative
expenses, the Copyright Office deposits the royalties with the
U.S. Treasury for investment pending distribution.7 1 Distribution of the royalty fees is the bailiwick of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal.72 The Copyright Royalty Tribunal (CRT or
Tribunal) was created by the 1976 Copyright Revision Act as
an independent entity in the legislative branch comprised of
five presidentially appointed commissioners. 3
Theoretically, distribution awards are to be determined by
the copyright owners themselves. 74 To facilitate this process,
the Act provides that
[n]otwithstanding any provisions of the antitrust laws, for purposes of this clause any claimants may agree among themselves as to the proportionate division of compulsory licensing
fees among them, may lump their claims together and file them
jointly or as a single claim, or may 75
designate a common agent
to receive payment on their behalf.

If no controversy exists over fee distribution, the CRT, after
deducting reasonable administrative costs, distributes the
fees. If, however, the CRT determines that a controversy does
exist, the Act directs the CRT to withhold those funds from distribution and to institute proceedings to determine their
proper distribution.7 6
In addition to its distribution functions, the CRT may adjust
the statutory rate schedule to reflect inflation or deflation,
changes in the average rates charged cable subscribers for basic services, and changes in FCC syndicated and sports exclusivity and distant signal rules.77
Such are the boundaries of the 1976 Copyright Revision as it
pertains to cable television and its operative complement, the
70. 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 96. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(2)(B) delineates

the statutory royalty rates.
71. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (3) (1982).
72. 17 U.S.C. ch. 8 (1982).
73. See Brylawski, The Copyright Office: A ContitutionalConfrontation,44 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1

(1975).

74. In practice, copyright owners have never applied for distributions without
causing controversy. See infra text accompanying note 142.
75. 17 U.S.C. § ll1(d) (5) (A) (1982).
76. 17 U.S.C. §§ 801(b) (3), 803(d) (1982).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 801 (1982).
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1972 FCC Cable Television Regulations. The retrospective afforded by the passage of time now offers the opportunity to
evaluate the implementation of these theories of communications and copyright law in actual practice.

III

The Growth of the Cable Industry
In 1976, the cable industry consisted of many "Mom and Pop"

businesses, interspersed with a few larger enterprises. The
small cable systems held little bargaining power and were financed by revenues derived primarily through basic retransmission services. 8 With the advent of satellite technology and
the influx of big business into cable, the industry underwent a
radical transformation.
The major changes in this industry occurred with the invention
of the telecommunications satellite which could beam multiple
television signals simultaneously to any ground station of a
cable company. This dramatic development led to an unprecedented growth of the cable television industry .... Industry
reports indicate that the cable industry has recorded an increase in earnings over the past four years of 641 percent.7 9
First, the growth in cable subscribers and cable services has
been phenomenal. Since 1976, the number of subscribers to
basic cable has risen from twelve million to over twenty-eight
million as of February, 1983.80 One industry analyst projects
that by 1990, cable will be the major delivery system for sixty
million households, and industry revenues will reach nineteen
billion dollars. 81
78. Copyright/CableHearings,supra note 62, at 904.
79. Oversight Hearingson the Copyright Office, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and the Copyright Royalty Tribunal Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties
and the Administrationof Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st

Sess. 1 (1981) (opening statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond, Chairman of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Cable Oversight Hearings].
80. Cable Stats, CABLEVISION, Apr. 18, 1983 at 145. A.C. Nielson Co.'s July, 1983 estimates place cable penetration at 39.3%, or 32,930,140 households. Last year's Nielson
estimate was 34% penetration, or 27,884,000 households. Arbitron's July, 1983 estimates place cable penetration at 35%, or 29,036,000 households. Notching the Latest
Numbers, CABLEVISION, Sept. 5, 1983, at 19. Even with the low-end figure, this represents more than a six-fold increase over the 1970 figure of 4.5 million. See also MuLTICHANNEL NEWS, June 14, 1982, at 1; TELEVISION DIGEST INC., TELEVISION FACTBOOK 83a (1981-1982).
81. Cable: The Winner, CABLEVISION, Oct. 11, 1982, at 55 (citing a report by Senior
Analyst Ronald Liebis of the investment house of Morgan, Olmstead, Kennedy &
Gardner).
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Pay-cable is contributing significantly to the growth of cable
in general. Subscriber penetration by pay-cable as of March,
1981 was 52.81%.82 Projections by industry analysts see penetration rising to roughly 76% by 1985 and perhaps 100% by the
end of this decade. 3 The proportionate revenue that pay-cable
is contributing to the industry is also rising. According to the
1980 FCC Annual Report, revenue from pay-cable rose from
$355 million in 1979 to $575 million in 1980, representing a 62%
increase. 4 In 1980, the cable industry derived 25.7% of its reves
nue from pay servicesY
The development of pay-cable is intimately linked to two
technological advances-satellite technology as a means of
programming delivery, and the development of broad channel
capacity. Satellite technology, unlike microwave and over-theair reception, provides an economical means for distributing
high quality signals nationwide. 6 With the advent of broad
channel capacity, cable systems are hungry for the programming the satellites deliver. At the time of the Copyright Revision Act, twelve channel capacity was the standard. Today,
thirty-six channel capacity is the norm, and fifty channel capacity the state of the art. During the next five years, as cable
wires the major urban markets of the country, channel capacity will rise to the 60, 70, 80 and even 100-plus range. Denver's
87
ATC cable system already has a 108 channel capacity.
Along with pay-services, advances in cable technology fostered a plethora of cable networks, many of which "narrow
cast," operating mainly as special interest magazines by catering to specialized tastes. Thirty-two such cable networks
are currently in operation, with over thirty-three satellite dis82. Cable Stats, CABLEVISION, May 10, 1982, at 436. The FCC credits the rapid
growth of pay cable to the FCC's deletion of program content restrictions. See Home
Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
83. Cable/CopyrightHearings,supra note 62, at 895.
84. Cable: The Winner, supra note 81, at 55.
85. See Ladd, A Pavanfor Print: Accommodating Copyright to the Tele-technologies, 29 BuLL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 246, 249 (1982).
86. Satellite distribution has been aided by the following FCC deregulation: (1) allowing the use of smaller, less expensive earth stations, American Broadcasting Cos.,
62 F.C.C.2d 901 (1976); (2) authorizing resale common carriers to utilize satellite for
delivery of distant television signals to cable systems, Southern Satellite Sys. Inc., 62
F.C.C.2d 153 (1976); and (3) eliminating the FCC pay television anti-siphoning rule,
Home Box Office, 567 F.2d 9 (1977).
87. Cable/CopyrightHearings,supra note 62, at 835 (statement of Herman Land,
President, Association of Independent Television Stations, Inc.).
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tributed networks in the planning stage. 88 In addition to payservices, many of these networks are paid-for, that is advertiser-supported. Advertising revenues for cable were $45 million in 1980 and are expected to rise to $2.2 billion by the end of
the decade.8 9 Advertiser-supported cable networks come in a
variety of formats, such as sports, news and women's programming. Some offer their programming free, some pay for cable
carriage, and some, such as WTBS, charge a minimum payment per subscriber.9 0
The second major growth change involves the structure of
the industry itself. Characterized as "Mom and Pop" in 1976,
the cable industry today is dominated by Fortune 500 firms
such as Time, Inc., Westinghouse, General Electric and American Express, along with major broadcasting interests such as
Cox and ABC.9 1 The entry of this type of big business into
cable has made cable itself big business, as represented by the
trend of concentration within the cable industry. In 1982,
twenty-five MSOs (Multiple System Operators) controlled approximately sixty-three percent of cable subscribers. Fortythree percent of all cable subscribers are served by the top ten
MSOs alone.9 2 Furthermore, a 1981 study by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration of the Department of Commerce found that approximately half of the
cable systems in the U.S. are owned by the ten largest MSOs,
thirty-three percent of the cable systems are owned by television broadcasters and eighteen percent by program producers. 93
The trend toward concentration seems likely to
continue in light of the recent FCC Report and Order which
refused to adopt multiple ownership rules in the cable televi94
sion context.
88. CABLEVISION, Jan. 12, 1981, at 28; Mar. 16, 1981, at 17.

89. Dougherty, Cable TV Now Gets Ad Bureau, Feb. 24, 1981, at D21, col. 1.
90. E.g., Entertainment and Sports Network (Sports, owned by Getty), USA Network (Sports, owned by UA Columbia), Alpha Repertory Television Services (Cultural, owned by ABC/Warner/Hearst), Cineamerica (for the 45+ group), Satellite
Program Network (Women's), Black Entertainment Network, Spanish International
Network, Cable News Network.
91. Seven companies ranked in the "Forbes 500" own six of the ten largest MSOs.
See A Summary of the 500's Rankings, FORBES, May 9, 1983, at 266-305. See also Top 50
Financial Overview, CABLEVISION, June 20, 1983, at 137.
92. See CABLEVISION, May 16, 1983, at 78-79.
93. 1981 Cable Oversight Hearings,supra note 79, at 84.
94. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the matter of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations Relative to Elimination of the Prohibition of Common Ownership of Cable
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Another structural trend is vertical integration. For example, Time, Inc. is the parent company of both the largest payservice, Home Box Office, and the largest MSO, American Television and Communications Corporation (ATC). 9 5 Following
this trend is the partnership of two top-ten MSOs, Viacom and
Teleprompter, in the ownership of the second largest pay-service, Showtime. The fifth largest MSO, Warner/Amex Cable
Communications, jointly owned by Warner Communications
and American Express, owns the Movie Channel pay-service.
Spotlight pay-movie service is owned by Times-Mirror which,
in turn, owns Times-Mirror Cablevision, the seventh largest
MSO. 96
The expansion of cable should continue apace during the
next five years, as cable makes inroads into the most lucrative
markets for penetration, the major urban centers.9 7 In 1980, fifteen major communities, including Dallas, New Orleans, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Indianapolis and Fort Worth, were awarded
cable franchises." In 1981-1982, the major markets of Miami,
Tucson, Chicago, Baltimore, New York (outlying boroughs),
Boston, Milwaukee, Denver, Montgomery County (Maryland),
Sacramento, and Minneapolis were awarded franchises.9 9
Expansion into the major metropolitan areas should continue the trend of industry concentration, as the major MSOs
are quite active in these franchise battles. For example,
Warner/Amex garnered five of the major franchise awards in
1980.100 In part, the success of MSOs in these big city franchise
battles is related to the companies' financial resources, as very
large capital expenditures will be required to wire these marTelevision Systems and National Television Networks in Docket No. 82-434, FCC 82323, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,213 (1982).
95. In 1980, ATC's total subscribership was 1,500,000. Today that figure is over four
million-over two million basic subscribers and almost two million pay subscribers.
BROADCASTING, Oct. 25, 1982, at 29; id. Nov. 8, 1982, at 48.
96. Copyright Office update of CABLEVISION, Jan. 12, 1981, at 28; id. Mar. 16, 1981, at
17 reprintedin Cable/CopyrightHearings,supra note 62, at 933. See generally MAJORITY STAFF OF THE HousE SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTECTION
AND FINANCE, 97TH CONG., IST SEss., TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITION: THE STATE
OF COMPETITION IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY (Comm. Print 1981).

97. See generally Cable FranchisingUpdate, BROADCASTING, July 12, 1982, at 37.

98. DONALDSON, LUFKIN, JENRETrE SECURITIES
(1981) [hereinafter cited as DONALDSON].

CORP., CABLE TELEVISION

1981, at 18

99. See Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Cable Industry Viewpoint 24 (1982).
100. Id.
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kets. 01' Even if awards are given to smaller local firms, however, acquisition by an MSO often follows. For example, after
the franchise awards in Houston to four local firms, three of the
firms sold majority interests to MSOs before system building
10 2
had even begun.
MSOs, themselves, are not immune to mergers and takeovers. If consolidation is the trend for the cable industry, this
trend extends to the MSOs. A typical example is H&B American Corporation, the largest MSO in 1970, which merged with
Teleprompter and Reeves Telecom Corporation in 1971 to form
the Teleprompter Corporation. Teleprompter, in turn, was acquired by Westinghouse, which also owns Group W Cable. Teleprompter is now the second largest MSO. Another example
of this merger mania is TCI, the third largest MSO, which since
1976 has acquired two other MSOs, Athena Communications
10 3
and Horizon.
While cable has been maturing as an industry, new forms of
program delivery have been entering the video marketplace.
Among these are MDS, STV, Low Power Television and Direct
Broadcast Satellite.'
As of the summer of 1982, there were
101. Copyright/CableHearings,supra note 62; Technology & Economics, Inc., The
Emergence of Pay Cable Television, IV the Urban Franchising Context 41 (1980).
102. Id. See also Bloom, The Invasion of the Cable Snatchers, TEX. MONTHLY, Mar.
1980.
103. Since 1976, 11 of the 25 largest MSOs have either been acquired by or merged
with a major business corporation. Major mergers in 1980-1981 included: Newhouse/
Metrovision with Daniels &Assoc., Cablecom General with Capital Cities Comm., Teleprompter with Westinghouse, Horizon Comm. with Tele-Communications, Midwest
Video with Time, Inc., International Cable with Prime Cable, Vision Cable with Newhouse and UA-Columbia Cablevision with Rogers Cable systems. See DONALDSON,
supra note 98, at 62-63.
104. Third Report and Order in Docket No. 21502-281, FCC 82-281, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,069
(1982); STV: Report and Order in B.C. Docket No. 78-253, FCC 82-107, 47 Fed. Reg.
21,468 (1982); Low Power Television: Report and Order in Gen. Docket No. 80-603, FCC
82-285, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,555 (1982).
Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS) uses omnidirectional microwave signals to deliver video, data, test or other material to subscribers. MDS is a common carrier service, and operators have traditionally leased most of their
station time to pay movie entrepreneurs, who in turn obtain their programming from Home Box Office or other suppliers and convey it to hotels, apartment buildings, cable systems, and private homes.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, NEW TECHNOLOGIES AFFECTING RADIO &
TELEVISION BROADCASTING 6 (1981).

The FCC has recently approved Multichannel (MDS, MMDS), and applications are
currently pending. See BROADCASTING, Sept. 12, 1983, at 23. Because MDS does not
involve the costly laying of cable, it provides a practical and inexpensive alternative to
cable. As MDS becomes MMDS, its viability as a competitor to cable should
strengthen. "For example, an MDS marketer could offer a package of complementary
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seventy-three active MDS stations supplying subscription entertainment programming to over sixteen million households,
and 419 applications were pending for authorization of new
MDS stations.'0 5 Nonexperimental STV did not have its advent until 1977. As of May 1, 1982, twenty-seven STV stations
served a market potential of almost thirty-three million television households. The FCC has authorized an additional sixteen STV stations and applications are pending for the
authorization of thirty-one more. 6
Although these new forms are still in their infancy, they
have the potential for further revolutionizing the video marketplace. However, it should be noted that while these forms represent competition to cable, only cable enjoys the competitive
advantage of the compulsory license. These new forms of competition, smaller and less organized than cable, must vie for an
audience in the open market.
How do these sweeping changes in the nature of cable and
the video marketplace affect the viability of the compulsory license? First, while cable systems are now lucrative enough to
pay higher fees, they may actually be paying less than was
originally intended. Present marketing techniques of cable are
quite different from earlier flat rate subscriber fee structures.
Through the advent of "addressable channel converters," cable
systems now offer tiers of service at varying costs to the cuschannels-movies, sports, news, culture, ethnic-at a price which might be affordable
by the 45 percent of consumers who presently forego cable when it is offered to them."
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, supra note 104, at 7.
STV stands for subscription television, which "involves the broadcasting of a scrambled television signal which, on payment of a fee, subscribers are authorized to unscramble." In re Subscription TV Program Rules, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 2 (1974). Low Power
Television (LPTV) is literally a low power broadcast signal, a "mini-TV station" with a
limited coverage area, which can retransmit regular television signals or transmit satellite delivered programming. It is supported by advertising, subscription, or taxes.
See BROADCASTING, Mar. 8, 1982, at 35; id. Apr. 4, 1983, at 141. "Direct broadcasting/
Satellite (DBS) service is a radiocommunication service in which signals from earth
are retransmitted by high power, geostationary satellites for direct reception by small,
inexpensive earth terminals." Report and Order in General Docket No. 80-603, 90
F.C.C.2d 676, 676 n.1 (1982), appeal pending. Eight Direct Broadcast Satellites have
been authorized, see BROADCASTING, Nov. 8, 1982, at 40.
105. Census of MDS Pay TV as of 12/31/81, MULTICAST, Mar. 22, 1982, at 6-7.
106. Third Report and Order, 47 Fed. Reg. at para. 19; PAUL KAGAN ASSOCIATES, INC.,
PAY

TV

SUBSCRIBER HISTORY: THE KAGAN CENSUS OF CABLE AND PAY TV AS OF DECEM-

1981 (1982). The most recent subscriber count available for STV stations (based
on 25 stations as of Dec. 31, 1981) puts total subscribership at 1,319,459. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 94, at 9.
BER
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tomer. 10 7 For example, a system may offer two tiers to its customer, one consisting of local and "near" distant signals and
the next tier consisting of a package including satellite-delivered programming, some pay-services and some advertisersupported networks, which may include the retransmission of
distant signals. Register of Copyrights, David Ladd, points out
that this marketing technique "may have the unintended effect
of artificially reducing the 'basic service' gross receipts base
and the accompanying level of royalty payments."'10 8
Another change in marketing techniques involves offering
basic services either below cost or free in order to enhance
prospects for franchise awards. The system recoups any losses
through the tiering of more profitable pay-services. As the
penetration of pay-cable increases and the urban franchise
battlescbecome more heated, this technique of marketing will
see greater use.
The growth and prosperity of the cable industry vitiates the
underlying rationale for the compulsory license. 10 9 The "excessive leverage" theory-that cable would be closed out of the
programming market by big business broadcasting and program production-is no longer valid in light of pay-cable's tremendous success and the growth of the advertiser-supported
networks. Cable is big business. Cable now negotiates on a
free market basis for three of the four services it provides the
public."0 Only last year, Home Box Office outbid the networks
for the rights to Wimbledon. With the advent of cable-oriented
production companies such as Oak Industries and T.A.T. Communications, and with the expansion of broadcasting interests
in cable ownership and programming, the marketplace appears
to be opening up to cable."'
107. Addressable channel converters give CATV, STV or MDS systems the capacity
to "control, through special boxes attached to a subscriber's set, the electronic distribution of programming so that only those authorized are able to receive it in viewable
form." DELSON & MICHALOVE, DELSON'S DICTIONARY OF CABLE, VIDEO AND SATELLITE
TERMS 15 (1983). See also T. BALDwIN & D. McVoY, CABLE COMMUNICATION, 51-55

(1983).

"Tiering" refers to "different packages of programs and services on cable TV

systems for different prices." 3 THE

CABLE/BROADBAND COMMUNICATIONS BOOK

165

(1982-1983).
108. Cable/CopyrightHearings,supra note 62, at 940-45.
109. See supra note 62.
110. On the present negotiating capabilities of cable, see Cable/Copyright Hearings, supra note 62, at 85-90 (statement of David Ladd, Register of Copyrights).
111. On the development of production services for cable, see id. at 961 (statement
of David Ladd).
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Direct negotiations are far more feasible, due to the concentration within the industry. Program suppliers negotiate directly with approximately six hundred television stations,
making negotiating in the cable environment a less arduous
task. Direct negotiation may be further simplified by the trend
toward the development of state-wide and regional cable system networks. In these networks, smaller systems form networks via interconnecting microwave in order to share
production facilities and advertising, and to acquire origination
programming." 2 With the bulk of cable systems encompassed
by MSOs and the smaller systems forming cooperative networks, direct negotiation with cable may prove to be less complex than with broadcasting.
Direct negotiation may not even be necessary, however, with
the use of wholesalers and middlemen who deliver programming to cable complete with all rights and clearances. The networks frequently employ the services of programming
middlemen; given cable's present strength and stature, the
middlemen could prove a workable alternative to direct
negotiation.
The middlemen are already in place in the broadcasting industry and have been for a long time. A middleman merely is a
purveyor who supplies a program with all of the rights and
clearances bundled in and makes it available to an exhibitor
The networks do this. They either produce the programs
....
from program suppliers
themselves or they buy the programs
3
and supply it to their stations."
A further argument against the validity of the cable compulsory license is that cable is now able to pay for the programming it uses at marketplace prices. An examination into the
history of the development of the cable compulsory license
reveals a desire to give the infant cable industry a financial
break so that it could afford the costly process of laying
cable." 4 The royalty fees were extremely low, approximately
one percent of subscriber revenues. Although the copyright
owners in principle opposed such low rates, they agreed to
support the arrangement because of the protection afforded by
112. Id. at 28. "[B]y the end of the first-quarter of 1981, approximately 80 systems
(representing 1.5 million subscribers) will be linked in almost a dozen regions." Interconnects: The Numbers Game, CABLEVISION, Mar. 9,1981, at 38.
113. Cable/CopyrightHearings,supra note 62, at 896 (statement of David Ladd).
114. See R. BERNER, supra note 23, at 50.
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the FCC distant signal and syndicated exclusivity rules.'
Cable is no longer in its infancy, yet it still receives programming at below market rates, while the emerging industries of
MDS, STV and low-power television pay the market rates. The
effect of the compulsory license today may be the subsidization of cable at the cost of the development of new delivery
technology.
IV

FCC Deregulation
The FCC has recently expanded the compulsory license's
subsidization of cable development by allowing unlimited importation of distant signals and by rescinding the syndicated
exclusivity rules." 6 This deregulation destroyed the delicate
balance between cable-copyright and communications law,
providing the catalyst for the reexamination of the compulsory
license.
Prior to the FCC's 1980 action, deregulation in the cable context had been a piecemeal revision of communications policy.
After finding in the early 1970's that cable was not a significant
threat to broadcasting, the FCC gradually removed many regulatory restraints.1 7 The FCC used the passage of the 1976
Copyright Revision Act to reopen the examination of the syndicated-exclusivity and distant signal rules, arguing that these
rules had been copyright surrogates rather than complements,
and that they may no longer be appropriate in light of the Act's
passage."18
The major rationale for the rules was the insurance of a
healthy programming supply and thereby of an adequate
broadcasting system. FCC reassessment of the rules indicated
115. See 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12 at 89; see also supra note 68.
116. Report and Order in Docket Nos. 20988 and 21284, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980) (Order
upheld in Malrite TV, Inc. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143
(1982)). See N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1980, at D4, col. 4.
117. This deregulation included the softening of late night carriage rules, Late Night
Television Programming, 48 F.C.C.2d 699 (1974); permission to carry specialty stations,
Specialty Stations-First Report and Order, 58 F.C.C.2d 442 (1976); and abrogation of
the "leapfrogging rules," in Docket 20487, 57 F.C.C.2d 625 (1976).
118. See In re Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, Notice of
Inquiry in Docket No. 20988, 61 F.C.C.2d 746 (1976); In re Economic Relationship Between Television Broadcasting and Cable Television, Report in Docket No. 21284, 71
F.C.C.2d 632 (1979); In re Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, Report in Docket No. 20988, 71 F.C.C.2d 951 (1979).
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that they had no real effect on the quantity and quality of the
programming that would otherwise be available to the public
and were therefore unnecessary. The Commission also concluded that continued imposition of the rules entailed significant sacrifices in program diversity." 9
Besides, the
Commission reasoned, surely Congress anticipated this in enacting the provision in 17 U.S.C. §§ 801(6) (2) (B) and (C) granting the CRT authority to change royalty rates if the FCC
20
changes the rules.1
While the FCC's decision may have been valid communications policy, 121 the syndicated exclusivity and distant signal
rules were not a product purely of communications needs.
They were part of a delicate balance, and their removal vitiated
their complement, the cable portion of the 1976 Copyright Act.
Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights during the revision
process, refutes the FCC's statement that Congress foresaw
the abrogation of the rules, stating that the provisions of the
Act relating to CRT rate adjustment in light of FCC rule
changes were designed to accommodate flexibility in FCC
rulemaking and were in anticipation of piecemeal revision
rather than outright appeal.
Congress entrusted to the Copyright Royalty Tribunal the task
of adjusting royalty rates if the FCC rules were changed, but it
did not expect the CRT to have to cope with the rates in a completely deregulated situation. On this assumption, it placed
certain constraints on the authority of the Tribunal to adjust
rates to meet a changed regulatory environment. Had Congress anticipated complete deregulation, it is 1doubtful
whether
22
those constraints would have been imposed.
On the contrary, as demonstrated on the face of the Act and by
its legislative history, the cable compulsory license was premised upon the syndicated exclusivity and distant signal rules.
As the recent FCC action illustrates, this was a shaky premise
indeed.
[TIhe FCC's action throws a dramatic spotlight on the shaky
underpinnings of section 111 and the need to consider a different statutory approach. In 1976 it was generally, if not univer119. 1980 Report and Order, supra note 116.
120. Syndicated Program Exclusivity Report, 71 F.C.C.2d at 968-69.
121. Malrite TV, 652 F.2d at 1140.
122. Cable Television and the Compulsory License, Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong., First Sess. 22 (1979).
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sally assumed that the FCC might tinker with its rules but that
it would not completely abandon the protection it offered copyright owners. What has happened demonstrates the imprudence of making section 111 so dependent upon regulatory
provision that could be abolished by the vote of the one Commissioner, and without advance
consultation with the Congres123
sional Committees involved.
The effects of FCC deregulation upon the operation of the
compulsory license are so opposed to the basic principles of
copyright that Congress has been forced to revise section 111
to mitigate the damage. 124 The networks will not be adversely
affected by deregulation because their signals have been carried free from copyright liability all along, 125 and because the
FCC is progressively deregulating network regulations, allowing the networks to enter new markets and to exploit more
fully their traditional markets. 2 6 However, the effects of the
deregulation on copyright owners and independent broadcasting could be quite severe.
The deregulation will further reduce copyright owners' potential for investment recoupment through syndication. 27 Already, local stations are bidding down their licensing fees to
reflect the erosion in syndicating value due to cable's present
capacity to import the same programming. As Jack Valenti,
President of the Motion Picture Association of America, points
out, a "broadcast station does not want to license a show that is
being exhibited in the same market by a competing station or
imported by a local cable system from a distant television station."'128 Furthermore, the royalty payment copyright owners
will receive under the compulsory license from the increased
carriage of distant signals will be insufficient to fully compensate them for the devaluation of their programming because
123. Id.
124. See infra text accompanying note 160.
125. See supra text accompanying note 64.
126. The most recent move is toward removing the Financial Interest and Syndication Rule (which disallows network retention of residuals), and the cross ownership
restrictions. For the argument that these changes will damage both independent television and the small production companies, see Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1982, at 35, col. 4.
127. "Licensing his [the program owner's] program for limited periods of time in
the syndication market is the sole entry point for investment recoupment." Cable/
Copyright Hearings, supra note 62, at 81 (statement of Jack Valenti, President,
MPAA).
128. Jack Valenti, A Pleafor FairPlay 28 (1981), reprinted in 1981 Cable Oversight
Hearings, supra note 79, at 232.
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those rates are artificially low and do not reflect the market
demand.
Independent stations will be significantly affected by the networks' increasing ability to compete and cable's increased use
of distant signals. The audience fragmentation caused by the
unrestricted importation of distant signals will average twenty
percent for independents, which also means that advertising
revenues will decline, based as they are on audience share and
size."' The effect of the deregulation upon the independent
stations will further damage copyright owners' ability to fully
exploit their products since the independents represent the
backbone of the syndication market. 3 '
The plight of independent station KOKI, Channel 23, of
Tulsa, Oklahoma illustrates the effects of the deregulation on
independents. Cable penetration in Tulsa is now approaching
fifty percent. KOKI, as an independent, purchased almost all
of its programming. Now, eighty to eighty-five percent of that
programming is duplicated by cable's distant signal importation in Tulsa. This programming is heavily advertised by the
cable systems. Arbitron surveys support the finding that this
increased importation of distant signals has reduced KOKI's
audience by one-third. KOKI asserts that advertisers are now
reluctant to buy time on KOKI because of the reduced audiences and because identical programming is appearing on
cable. Distant signal importation has produced a reduction in
revenues at KOKI of thirty to thirty-five percent annually.' 3 '
Finally, the FCC's deregulation in this area is in direct conflict with other FCC policies designed to foster new forms of
program delivery, 1 32 and with the recent Supreme Court holding that "[d] iversification of mass media ownership serves the
public interest by promoting diversity of program and service
viewpoints as well as preventing undue concentrations of
power.' ' 33 FCC deregulation has given the networks and the
129. This effect is exacerbated by the fact that independents are losing money to
begin with; 22.2% of independent VHF stations and 50.7% of independent UHF stations
are unprofitable. Cable/CopyrightHearings,supra note 62, at 833. Economic Relationship Report, 71 F.C.C.2d at 718.
130. CRT Royalty Adjustment, infra note 131, at 52,156.
131. TR 539-540, 611,571-76 of Copyright Royalty Tribunal Adjustment of the Royalty
rate for Cable Systems; Federal Communications Commission's Deregulation of the
Cable Industry, Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 52,146, 52,155 (1982) [hereinafter cited as CRT
Royalty Adjustment ].
132. See supra text accompanying note 104.
133. FCC v. National Citizens' Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 780 (1978).
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cable industry a competitive edge which can only produce further concentration within both industries, at the cost of the independents, the new technologies and the copyright owners.

V
The Copyright Royalty Tribunal
In the fall of 1982, the Copyright Royalty Tribunal responded
to FCC deregulation, following the mandate of section
801(a) (2) (B) and (C) to insure that the rates for the additional
distant signals and changes in exclusivity would be reasonable. Its finding of what was reasonable under these circumstances more closely approximated the marketplace than any
prior fees under the compulsory license. Before this decision,
the rate for the first distant signal was .799% of gross receipts;
the CRT's new rate determination calls for a rate of 3.75%, a
significant increase over the statutory charges which may well
cause cable systems to reconsider the benefits of distant signals.' The cable industry currently pays about $29 million annually in royalty fees under the compulsory license. Thomas
Brennan, acting chairman of the CRT, estimates that the recent CRT decision may mean an increase of $15 million to $20
million annually in royalty payments if all cable operators
con1 35
now.
do
they
as
signals
many
as
import
to
tinue
In addition to increasing the distant signals fee, the CRT
ruled that "the fee for each signal formerly subject to the FCC
program syndication rules shall be adjusted to include the additional fee, determined on the basis of the number of the signals and the size of the market, as established in the proposed
final rule."'3 6 This surcharge on existing signals, designed to
compensate copyright owners for the loss of black-out protection, plus the increased rates for carriage of new distant signals, may result in cable systems paying eight to sixteen times
134. CRT Royalty Adjustment, supra note 131. Any cable system with less than
$214,000 in semi-annual gross receipts from basic services is exempt from the new
rates. A number of other factors might apply to exempt particular systems from the
new rate.
135. Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1982, at 10, col. 3. See also Wash. Post, Mar. 6, 1983, at K13,
col. 5.
136. The surcharge for cable systems in the top 50 markets will be .599% of gross for
the first distant signal equivalent, .377% of gross for each of the second, third and
fourth distant signal equivalents, and .178% for the fifth. CRT Royalty Adjustment,
supra note 131, at 52,159. See BROADCASTING, Oct. 25, 1982, at 48.

COMM/ENT L. J.

[Vol. 6

more in copyright royalties.13 7
In reaching its conclusions, the CRT found that "[n]either
the rates in the copyright law nor the legislative history limit
our adjustment of the rates for those signals and programs
within the scope of this proceeding . . . . [W]e were not expected to look to the statutory schedule for guidance as to the
measure of reasonable compensation." 38 In making the new
distant signal adjustment, the CRT found that the Act directed
them to consider, "among other factors, the economic impact
on copyright owners and users" and to consider the effect of
the FCC action "on copyright owners and users, including
broadcast stations, and the effect of such distant signals on local broadcasters' ability to service the public."' 3 9 In the syndicated exclusivity adjustment, the CRT found authorization
from Congress to "assure that such rates are reasonable in
light of the changes to such rules and regulations."' 4 0 In its
findings of what was reasonable, the CRT found no "public policy justification for establishing royalty rates below reasonable
marketplace expectations of the copyright owners" and "no
economic or policy justification for copyright owners to subsiThe CRT
dize the existing or developing cable industry."''
based its decision upon copyright principles, recognizing that
its decision might adversely affect the cable industry but finding that "Congress has not assigned to this body the determination of national policy as to fostering of various competing
methods of transmitting programs to the public."
The rates we have adopted will result in a significant increase
in the cost to an operator for carriage of a distant signal, and
are likely to have an impact on the level of profitability of some
cable systems. But we cannot restrict our rate determination
to its effect on cable industry profits. Rather, we must strike a
balance between copyright owner and user, while also remembering that only the cable operator has freedom of choice in
this congressional mandated marriage. 42
As a result of this rate adjustment proceeding, the CRT has
indeed emerged as a major counterweight in balancing the
conflicting interests of cable, broadcasting and programming
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

BROADCASTING, Oct. 25, 1982, at 48.
CRT Royalty Adjustment, supra note 131, at 52,152.
Id.; 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 12, at 176.
CRT Royalty Adjustment, supra note 131, at 52,152.
Id. at 52,153.
Id.
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interests.'4 3 However, this decision, in keeping with the trend
of final decisions of the CRT regarding the cable compulsory
,license, is currently under appeal. The high incidence of appeals plaguing CRT decisions is but one statutorily imposed
flaw in the structure of the CRT. From its inception, the CRT
has been constrained by the terms of the statute from operating efficiently and effectively.
First, in the case of "controversy" proceedings' 4 4 the 1976
Copyright Revision Act contains no specific provisions to guide
the CRT in determining how to divide the royalties among
competing copyright owners. The House Committee on the Judiciary did not think it appropriate to specify limiting standards for distribution and left the determination to the CRT
based on the pertinent data and considerations presented by
45
the claimants themselves.'
In addition to giving the CRT no distribution guidelines, the
Act failed to afford the CRT subpoena power, a vital element to
the gathering of evidence to make balanced determinations.
Apparently, the omission of subpoena power was inadvertent.
While the initial Senate bill contained the power, the House
bill omitted the power in its reformulation of the CRT.' 46 When
the House applied the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to
the CRT, it was assumed that subpoena power automatically
attached. In reality, under the APA, the subpoena power must
be incorporated into the enabling statute of the agency the
APA is regulating. This lack of subpoena power effectively denies the CRT access to information that could be crucial to the
decision making process. As was noted by the CRT in its 1980
royalty adjustment proceedings, lack of subpoena power
places the CRT in "the position of receiving only the evidence
which the parties choose to present."'41 7 The CRT cannot receive evidence from the cable companies to aid in the Tribu143. National Cable Television Ass'n v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, No. 82-2389
(D.C. Cir., filed Nov. 19, 1982). See CABLEVISION, Oct. 3,1983, at 19, 56. In addition, cable
forces are seeking to nullify or severely restrict the CRT decision through legislation in
the 98th Congress. H.R. 2902, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., would exempt the first three distant
independent television signals from the new rates. S. 1270, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., would
exempt the satellite-delivered "superstation" WTBS-TV from the new rates.
144. 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 97.
145. Id.
146. See S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 801-807 (Comm. Print 1969); H.R. REP. No.
1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 81-82 (1976).
147. Note, The Copyright Royalty Tribunal: Achieving EquilibriumBetween Cable
and Copyright Interests, 1 Loy. ENTERTAINMENT L.J. 147, 160 (1981) (quoting from inter-
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nal's determinations because only copyright claimants come
under CRT purview in the distribution proceedings.
Although the congressional intent that distribution of royalty fees shall be made promptly is clear, the 1976 Copyright
Revision Act impedes prompt distribution through its requirement that funds be withheld pending appeals.'4 8 All of the
CRT's cable distribution proceedings have been appealed and,
consequently, distributions have been withheld.'49
"The appeals of the Tribunal's decisions allege that the Tribunal did not properly distribute royalty funds, made decisions not supported by the record, established fees not
authorized by the Copyright Act, and was inconsistent in the
admission of evidence to the hearings.' '

50

The appeal rate may

be partially explained by the truism that everyone wants a bigger piece of the pie, in this case a pie worth millions of dollars.
Additionally, the lack of established criteria increases the likelihood of appeal. As the CRT establishes valid criteria for distribution determinations, the appeal rate may decline.
However, other statutory weaknesses hinder the operational
effectiveness of the CRT. First, none of the original CRT commissioners had experience in ratesetting or regulatory work;
only one had any significant financial or economic background.' 5 1 Consequently, it took the Tribunal over a year to get
"up to speed" in its work. 2 The Tribunal is now regarded as
being knowledgeable and capable, but its effectiveness could
be greatly enhanced.
The CRT lacks both a general counsel and a method of access to an objective opinion, and the support staff consists of
view with Thomas Brennan, Senior Commissioner, Copyright Royalty Tribunal (Aug.
22, 1980)).
148. 17 U.S.C. § 809 (1976).
149. See Cable/Copyright Hearings, supra note 62, at 918-19 (experience of the
Copyright Office and the Copyright Royalty Tribunal under the new law).
150. 1981 Cable Oversight Hearings,supra note 79, at 79 (statement of Wilbur D.
Campbell, Deputy Director, Accounting and Financial Management Division, United
States General Accounting Office).
151. Mary Lou Berg was vice-chair and deputy chair of the Democratic National
Committee (1970-1977); prior to that, she worked in radio and television in Jackson,
Wisconsin. Clarance James (former CRT chairman) was special counsel to the Ohio
Attorney General (1972-1977). Douglas Coulter was a free-lance writer who worked in
the Carter and McGovern presidential campaigns. Francis Garcia was the audit and
office manager of the Austin office of Arthur Anderson & Co. Thomas Brennan served
as Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights
during the revision.
152. 1981 Cable Oversight Hearings, supra note 79, at 96 (GAO report).
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one secretary for each commissioner. A recent study by the
General Accounting Office (GAO) found that in numerous instances the Tribunal performed tasks requiring a "significant
degree of legal interpretation."' 5 3 A general counsel could considerably lessen the appeal rate of CRT decisions through advice on the admissibility of evidence and other procedural
matters. In addition, a general counsel could be instrumental
in the writing of decisions and the handling of judicial
54
appeals.1
The Tribunal has the authority to hire outside consultants
but has never received adequate funding to do so. As the GAO
report points out, many of the rate adjustments and royalty
distributions are based on complex economic analysis. Competing interest groups submit to the CRT complex economic
studies and justifications that have been developed by leading
economists and attorneys. Access to objective expert opinion
would be most helpful to the CRT in its review of this evidence.
The lack of criteria for royalty allocations has been a significant obstacle to prompt distribution. During 1980, the CRT
conducted proceedings to determine the appropriate distribution of the royalty fees deposited by cable systems for secondary transmissions in 1978, announcing its final determination
on July 30, 1980.155 The CRT based its decision on the following
criteria:
1. The harm caused to copyright owners by secondary transmissions of copyrighted works by cable systems;
2. The benefit derived by cable systems from secondary transmissions of certain copyrighted works;
3. The marketplace value of the works transmitted; and
4. The quality of the copyrighted program material and time
153. Id. at 96-97. The GAO Report enumerated these tasks as: reviewing court deci-

sions cited by claimants in order to interpret the first amendment and its application to
copyright law; consideration of contracts between television stations and sports teams;
reviewing common law principles relating to competing claimants; examining the legislative history of the Copyright Act to establish congressional intent; and developing
administrative procedures consistent with the Administrative Procedures Act.
154. Id. at 97. In a GAO survey of six other federal commissions, all six retained
general counsel. Id. at 102.
155. CRT Royalty Adjustment, supra note 131, at 50,621. The CRT allocation was as
follows: (1) 75% to the MPAA and other program syndicators; (2) 12% to Joint Sports
Claimants and the NCAA; (3) 5% to PBS; (4) 4.5% to Music and Performing Rights
Societies; (5) 3.25% to U.S. and Canadian Television Broadcasters; and (6) .25% to National Public Radio. The CRT subsequently modified this allocation, withdrawing the
award of .25% to NPR and increasing the allocation to PBS to 5.25%. See id. at 63,042
(1980).
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156

In the allocations proceedings the CRT determined that:
1. Royalty fees shall not be allocated to broadcaster claimants
for the secondary transmission;
2. Royalty fees shall not be allocated to copyright owners of
cartoon characters;
3. Royalty fees shall not be allocated to broadcaster claimants
who have acquired rights to syndicated programming in a market, which rights are exclusive against other broadcasters in
that market, when the syndicated programming is included in
distant broadcasts which are retransmitted into the broadcaster's market;
4. Royalty fees awarded by the CRT for the secondary transmission of certain sporting events shall be distributed to sports
claimants except when the contractual arrangements specifically provide that such royalties shall be distributed to broadcaster claimants;
5. The Public Broadcasting Service is not a network for purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 111; and
6. The record made in the proceeding provides no basis for an
allocation of royalty fees to commercial radio. 5 7
This allocation decision was appealed to the Second Circuit
by the National Association of Broadcasters, National Public
Radio, Major League Baseball, National Basketball Association, National Hockey League, North American Soccer League,
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the American Society
of Composers, Authors and Publishers. On April 9, 1982, the
court affirmed all of the Tribunal's allocations decisions as
neither arbitrary nor capricious and "well within the metes
prescribed by Congress.' 1 58 With this decision the CRT has
now established valid criteria for its judgments and greatly reduced the vulnerability of its decisions to appeal.
Now that the Tribunal's methods are known ...

broadcasters

will bargain more knowledgeably with sports teams about telecasts of sports events, and representatives of music, programs,
and movies may contract accordingly with television broadcasters. In any event, as the size of the Fund grows, the dispute over how to slice the pie may be more vigorous but it will
156. Id. at 50,621.
157. Id.
158. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675 F.2d 367
(D.C. Cir. 1982). The court remanded the CRT's decision to retract NPR's initial award
on procedural grounds. The Tribunal ordered a 50% partial distribution of $7,970,000
on May 8, 1981.
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also be more structured. The umpire has established precewhich the players may rely in submitting their
dents on
1 59
claims.

VI
The Congressional Response:
Consensus Revisited
By 1981, the massive changes within the cable industry, FCC
deregulation, and delays in royalty distribution led the majority of experts on cable copyright to urge the abrogation of the
compulsory license. 6 ° In testimony before the Subcommittee

on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, the Copyright Office
recommended that Congress amend section 111 of the Copyright Act to:
*eliminate the section 111 compulsory license for secondary

transmissions by cable systems;
*exempt from copyright liability the simultaneous secondary
transmission by cable systems of signals containing network
programming only to the extent necessary to assure a full complement of network signals in markets that lack one or more of
the three national television networks;

*exempt from copyright liability the simultaneous secondary
transmission of local signals by cable systems;
*clarify the present section 111(a) (3) exemption to make clear
that the activities of satellite resale carriers are subject to full

copyright liability; and
sec*provide for a transition period during which the present
161
tion 111 of the Copyright Act would remain in effect.
The rationale for these recommendations was that first,
established trends within the industry, which have 'continued
apace . . . point to the day when cable television, not broad-

casting, will become the basic national disseminator of programming. Second, the imposition of full copyright liability
159. Id. at 385.
160. Those recommending abolition of the compulsory license included Robert McConnel (Asst. Att'y Gen.), the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Mark S. Fowler (FCC Chairman), the Copyright Office and Clarance James
(former Chairman of the CRT). The Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and
Trademarks, disbanded after the 1976 Copyright Revision, has been revived in order to
deal with the assault of technology upon copyright; cable-copyright will be one of the
Subcommittee's first priorities. See Mathias: Portraitof a Statesman, CABLEVISION,
June 20, 1983, at 274.
161. Copyright/CableHearings,supra note 62, at 1389.
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would engender the use of contractual arrangements for
cable's retransmission of broadcast programming, as it has
with cable origination networks, and thus would not necessitate one-on-one bargaining between individual cable operators
and individual program copyright owners. Third, the exempt
carriage of local and network signals ... coupled with the fur162
ther 'small system' exemption included in the earlier bills
considered . . . would provide generous basic allowances for
cable retransmissions without either payment or bargaining.
Fourth, the imposition of full liability would permit all program
delivery systems to compete equally in the marketplace for the
acquisition of programming. Finally, unnecessary government
regulation and supervision of the compulsory license would be
eliminated.'6 3
After a series of hearings on the cable-copyright issue in
light of the FCC deregulation, the Subcommittee on Courts,
Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House
Committee on the Judiciary concluded that the cable-copyright provisions of the 1976 Revision were no longer workable.
At least four of the seven members of the Subcommittee favored complete abolition of the compulsory license. If the license were to be maintained, the Subcommittee favored an
increase in fees and renewal of carriage restrictions. 6 4
However, in September of 1981, Representative Kastenmeier, Chairman of the Subcommittee, relinquished the solution of the cable-copyright question to the major industries
involved: the National Association of Broadcasters, the Motion
Picture Association of America and the National Cable Television Association. Vincent J. Wasilewski, President of the NAB,
refers to the subsequent events as a d~j vu of the negotiations
leading to the Consensus Agreement of 1972.165 Apparently
fearing another congressional impasse over the cable-copyright issue, Kastenmeier called for an industry compromise
and closely supervised the negotiations process until the parties announced agreement on October 22, 1981. The "October
Compact" and the subsequent proposed copyright legislation,
162. See H.R. 3560, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982); H.R. 3528, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1982); H.R. 3844, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982).
163. Copyright/Cable Hearings,supra note 62, at 1389-90.
164. Id. at 1324.
165. Id. at 1357. For the various positions on the "October Compact," see id. at 12661375 (testimony of Thomas Wheeler, President of NCTA Jack Valenti, President of
MPAA; and Vincent T. Wasilewski, President of NAB); id. at 1375 (testimony of David
Ladd, Register of Copyrights).
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H.R. 5949, are virtually identical. The Compact basically called
for the reimposition of the status quo prior to FCC deregulation, combining communications and copyright into one bill
through the retention of the compulsory license and reinstatement of syndicated exclusivity requirements. 6 6
Although legislation by its nature is derived through compromise, adoption of the October Compact in the form of H.R. 5949
can only be considered a regression. This was not a compromise by legislators on competing communications and copyright policies, but a decision by financially interested parties
striving to protect their respective hegemonies. As such, it obfuscated the basic principles of copyright. Nevertheless, the
compact and its subsequent erosion serve as a cogent example
of the inherent imbalances in legislation left to industry.
H.R. 5949 did nothing to remedy the structural defects of the
CRT and it would have maintained a rate structure which was
unconscionable to begin with. In the spirit of compromise,
copyright owners were willing to acquiesce to low rates so long
as they secured syndicated exclusivity protection. 167 However,
subsequent to the agreement on the delicately balanced compromise, H.R. 5949 was subjected to a continual amendment
process, which one member of the Subcommittee characterized as "let's make a deal."' 6 8 The resulting legislation became
a compromise of the compromise. Eventually, the consensus
upon which H.R. 5949 was built collapsed from the weight of
one too many compromises. Few should mourn the death of
H.R. 5949; the legislation was anachronistic, devoid of any principled solution to the clash between cable and copyright. In
fact, if anything, H.R. 5949 would have strengthened cable's he166. H.R. REP. No. 559, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Although H.R. 5949 passed the
House in September, 1982 by a vote of 347-53, it failed to gain Senate approval before
the end of the second session of the 97th Congress.
The basic elements of the Compact are as follows:
1. Cable operators retain a compulsory license for an unlimited number of
distant signals; 2. reinstitution of pre-Mairite syndicated exclusivity rules
with certain modifications; 3. retention of the basic copyright fee schedule
prior to CRT adjustments of 1980 and 1981; 4. codification of current FCC
must-carry rules, with, however, significant exceptions; 5. "may carry" status
for the carriage of new broadcast services; and 6. codification of the current
FCC network nonduplication rules.
See Copyright/CableHearings,supra note 62, at 1318-19 (memorandum of the NCTA/
NAB/MPAA Compact).
167. Copyright/CableHearings,supra note 62, at 1378.
168. H.R. REP. No. 559, supra note 166, at 48 (dissenting views of M. Caldwell
Butler).
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gemony over alternative media forms, while shrinking the already shrunken protections afforded copyright owners.' 6 9
The contemplated exclusivity protection of H.R. 5949 would
have applied to all television markets, extending to the previously unprotected suburban and rural markets. However, several significant market exemptions within the compact
virtually vitiated any true exclusivity protection. 170 In addition,
H.R. 5949's exclusivity provision for series programming was
limited to the particular programming package, a significant
7
contraction of prior protection.' '
H.R. 5949 also contracted movie protection. The compact
placed limits on both the number of movies for which protection could be requested and the time periods during which pro72
tection would be granted.
What little exclusivity protection was afforded by the compact was further contracted by the Superstation Exemption,
introduced during the "compromise of the compromise." This
provision, arrived at without the consultation of the MPAA or
NAB but through a negotiation between Tom Wheeler (Presi169. See Cable Copyright and Signal CarriageAct of 1982: Hearingson H.R. 5949
Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportationand the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Fragile H.R. 5949 in Jeopardy,
BROADCASTING, Dec. 13, 1982, at 37. The fatal blows to H.R. 5949 occurred when the
NCTA, supported by Ted Turner, introduced an amendment that would in effect stay
the 1982 CRT rate hikes. See supra text accompanying note 132. The copyright owners
would not acquiesce. In addition, the cable and sports industries reached an impasse
over sports blackout rules. See also Fitzpatrick and Sherman, 97th Congress Reconciles
Few Copyright Debates, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 7, 1983, at 21.
170. Any system located outside all television markets is exempt. Any system of
3,000 or fewer subscribers is exempt. Any signal grandfathered under the 1972 FCC
rules, i.e., carried on any system in the community prior to March 31, 1982, continues to
be exempt. H.R. REP. No. 559, supra note 166, at 6. These exemptions covered a large
portion of the cable industry. NCTA stated that the first two exemptions would apply
to 79% of the 4141 systems analyzed from information contained in the 1980 TV
Factbook, and that of the 867 systems affected, 80% are grandfathered. See Copyright/
Cable Hearings,supra note 62, at 1321.
171. For example, if "I Love Lucy" was syndicated in several different packages a
broadcaster would only be granted protection as to the particular package purchased.
The series could be retransmitted into the broadcaster's market so long as it would not
duplicate the programming of the broadcaster's particular package. H.R. REP. No. 559,
supra note 166, at 6.
172. Under the compact, an independent station could claim exclusivity to no more
than 300 feature film titles in any three month period. Networks could assert exclusivity to no more than 100 feature film titles in any three month period. Both networks
and independents would assert exclusivity for any title for no more than six months
per calendar year. Id.
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dent of NCTA) and Ted Turner,'7 3 would grandfather existing
superstation program contracts, exempting them from compliance with the syndicated exclusivity rules for the life of their
contracts.'7 4 This provision would have the effect of exempting
contracts entered into even prior to deregulation when compliance with the exclusivity rules was required. Through the
Superstation Exemption, copyright owners who contracted
with a superstation envisioning limited exportation of their
product would be faced with the erosion of their syndication
markets without commensurate compensation. In addition,
while a superstation may import into an exclusive market a
program based on contracts entered into prior to the enactment of H.R. 5949, the same programming would be required1 to
75
be deleted from any other form of programming delivery.
The Superstation Exemption, therefore, is classic special interest legislation. WTBS is the only true superstation,176 and
many of WTBS's program contracts will not expire for another
five to seven years. Because of its satellite transmission, the
superstation may be picked up by virtually any cable system in
the country, meaning that under H.R. 5949, no broadcaster or
copyright owner could expect true exclusivity protection until
Turner's contracts run.
In addition to the exclusivity rules, H.R. 5949 would have
codified current FCC must-carry rules, requiring cable systems
to carry local television signals. 7 7 However, significant exceptions to the present rules would significantly erode the benefits
contemplated. 78 These exceptions would have greatly bene173. Copyright/CableHearings, supra note 62, at 1357. "[W]e have been informed
that, indeed, amendments have been imposed unilaterally ....
[Tl hese amendments
reflect consultation with and agreement by the Turner Broadcast System and the National Cable Television Association. Neither NAB nor the MPAA was informed of the
discussions ...
(Vincent Wasilewski, President of NAB).
174. H.R. Rep. No. 559, supra note 166, at 8. On superstations generally, see The
State of the Superstations, BROADCASTING July 23, 1979, at 29; Going Super with Ted,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 1, 1979, at 61; VARIETY, Mar. 7, 1979, at 1.
175. "The Copyright Office respectfully suggests that this provision virtually eviscerates the syndicated exclusivity terms agreed to by the cable, program supply and
broadcast industries," Copyright/Cable Hearings,supra note 62, at 1397.
176. Id. at 1305. "It is clear that the sole purpose and intent of 'the superstation
exemption' is to give a special grant of right and privilege to one individual-Ted Turner." Id. at 1307 (Jack Valenti).
177. This would entail the creation of two new sections of the Communications Act.
"It is the intent of the Committee that this Act shall provide the exclusive framework
for any restrictions on what signals a cable system may carry." H.R. REP. No. 559,
supra note 166, at 8.
178. These exceptions would have proven damaging to small independent stations
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fited the cable industry. According to a NCTA survey, the
must-carry provisions as embodied in H.R. 5949 would have relieved cable of fifty percent of its current must-carry burdens.
Sixty percent of the 774 systems surveyed could have dropped
one or more must-carry signals in favor of their choice of reve179
nue producing programming or basic cable services.
The most salient feature of H.R. 5949 as a solution to the
cable-copyright dilemma was not what the bill contained, but
what it did not contain. The status quo before deregulation
was flawed due to statutory defects; H.R. 5949 did very little to
cure those problems.
H.R. 5949 retained the basic fee schedule established in 1976,
even though that schedule was based upon no empirical data,
and even though such data is now available.' 8 0 The only alteration in the schedule was made in cable's favor: minimum payments now charged to all systems would be removed from
those signals that do not import distant signals. Additionally,
systems carrying less than one distant signal equivalent-for
example a system carrying three distant network stationswould be required to pay only a fraction of the minimum payment, and systems carrying fractions of a distant signal
equivalent would not be required to make any royalty
payment.' 81
and alternative delivery systems such as LPTV. Cable systems with 36 or fewer activated channels would not be required to carry signals of television stations representing less than a one percent share of the viewing audience in non-cable homes and less
than a two percent share in all television homes in which the system is located. Additionally, cable systems with 36 or fewer activated channels would not be required to
carry more than three noncommercial educational television stations. The rationale
for this exception was that systems with a limited channel capacity should be relieved
from carrying channels with very limited viewership so that they may make better use
of those channels. The exception would allow many systems with expanded capacity
potential to apply the exception to avoid certain "must-carries" until they have expanded beyond the 36 channel range. It would also have operated so as to preclude
systems hovering in the 36 channel range from expanding in order to avoid the trouble
and expense of "must-carries". See Copyright/CableHearings,supra note 62, at 1322.
179. Id. at 1326. H.R. 5949 provided that cable systems may carry new broadcast
services, such as low power television, subscription television, VHF drop-ins and direct broadcast satellite stations, regardless of whether these services would otherwise
be must-carry due to locations within the local service areas of cable systems. To keep
the may-carries from becoming must-carries, H.R. 5949 prohibited the FCC from expanding cable's must-carry obligations in the future. This would effectively abrogate
FCC policy decisions to promote alternative forms of programming and delivery
through the use of the must-carry device. See H.R. REP. No. 559, supra note 166, at 8.
180. The Act did not consider any of the CRT-established findings or criteria.
181. H.R. REP. No. 559, supra note 166.
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While H.R. 5949 did take tiering practices into account, 8 2 authorizing the CRT to consider such services in calculating
no guidance as to how that calculation
gross receipts, it gave
18 3
should be made.
While the Copyright Royalty Tribunal was retained as the arbiter of distributions and rate adjustments, H.R. 5949 did not
cure the structural deficiencies in the CRT. The Tribunal
would still have no general counsel, no subpoena power and no
access to expert opinion to deal with the vague criteria left in
the Act. Without increasing the CRT's ability to deal efficiently
with distribution and rate determinations, H.R. 5949 would
have increased the CRT's workload, providing for more frequent rate reviews by shortening the period between CRT rate
adjustment for inflation or deflation from five years to three.8
VII

Conclusion
Although not enacted, H.R. 5949 represents true corruption
of consensus. H.R. 5949 was envisioned as part of the Copyright Act itself, and yet the only true copyright provision, syndicated exclusivity, was severely eroded by the adjustments
and adaptations. The principles of copyright-the progress of
art and authorship, freedom of creative expression, reward of
merit as determined by the public's choice-became obscured
by this anachronistic "revision." The legislation was cluttered
by the details of compromise, by each industry trying to protect its economic interests. But perhaps this should be expected when industry is asked to legislate.
The U.S. Constitution directs Congress to promote the useful
arts through copyright. Copyright entitles one to compensation for the public performance of one's work. A compulsory
license is, basically, a derogation of copyright.'85 It should be
182. See supra text accompanying note 108.

183. H.R. REP. No. 559, supra note 166, at 23. H.R. 3412, The Free Market Copyright
Royalty Act, is presently before the 98th Congress. If passed, the Act would implement certain changes in the CRT by reducing the number of commissioners from five
to three and providing for the appointment of a general counsel and a chief economist
to the staff,
184. H.R. REP. No. 559, supra note 166, at 33.
185. Copyright/Cable Hearings, supra note 62, at 905.
What is copyright? Basically, it is a legal monopoly, of limited scope and duration, under whose terms authors are permitted to control the exploitation of
their creations. A compulsory license strikes to the core of this right because
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used, therefore, only when faced with a compelling reason.
That compelling reason in 1976 for cable was the negotiations
problem. Cable has now matured into a thriving industry, capable of negotiating and of paying marketplace prices. Absent
a compelling reason, copyright principles dictate that the compulsory license be removed so that copyright owners may derive full benefit from their product. It is for Congress to serve
these broader principles, and to legislate to implement them.
One can only hope that the next round of resolving the cablecopyright controversy will be devoid of the corruption of consensus embodied in H.R. 5949.

it deprives authors and copyright owners of the power to control the use of
their creations.

